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IN 'l'HE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL D. LEVIE, Trustee of 
the Paul D. and Rae Levie 
Trust dated November 20, 1973: 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Sevier County, a political 
subdivison of the State 
of Utah, IVAN MILLS, DEAN c. 
NIELSEN, ELMO HERRING, 
SCOTT l!Al'lLEY, GRANT OGDEN 
T. M. ASHMAN, AHNO BASTIAN, 
and N. ANDY WINGET, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 16652 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS-PLAINTIFFS 
STATEMENT OF THE UATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff sued the County Board of Commissioners 
seeking a determination that his proposed subdivision plat 
satisfies the requirements of the GRF-1 zone and should, 
therefore, be approved. 
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT 
Both plaintiff and defendants moved for summary 
judgment. After oral argument, the Court took the motion 
under advisement and subsequently granted defendants' 
motion. In a very brief order, the Court determined that 
Plaintiff's proposed subdivision plat did not meet the 
requirements of the GRF-1 zone. The Court offered no 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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justification for its decision. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the sununary judgment 
in favor of defendants. In addition, plaintiff seeks a 
finding of summary judgment in favor of pJ aintiff on the 
grounds that, as a matter of law, defendants acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously by: 1) not approvin<J plaintiff': 
plat which satisfies all of the GRF-1 zone requirements, 
and 2) depriving plaintiff of his administrative remedies, 
STA'IEJlENT OF FACTS 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-1 to l.7-27-27 
(1953), the Sevier County Board of Commissioners on July 
19, 1965, adopted a Sevier County Zoning Ordinance and 
an official zoning map of Sevier County (Hawley deposition, 
p. 8). 
Article IV, §4-18, of the zoning ordinance 
provides: 
Subdivision development plan. 
The owner or owners of any land of not less than 
three (3) acres in area, desiring to subdivide 
such land, shall submit to the Planning Commission 
a complete devel~.12!!1~~! plan in ac~ordance with 
the subdivision regulations of Sevier County. 
(Emphasis added) 
The only subdivision regulation for the Sevier 
County ever enacted by the Board of Commissioners requlates 
the subdivison of mountainous and semi-mountainous land 
-2-
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in the unincorporated territory of the county. Said sub-
division regulation, according to its terms, does not apply 
to plaintiff's application. This is admitted and acknowledged 
by the director of Sevier County Planning and Zoning, Scott 
Hawley (Hawley deposition, pp. 9-10). 
According to the zoning ordinance and the official 
zoning map, plaintiff's subject property is and at all 
times has been included in the GRF-1 Grazing, Recreation 
and Forestry Zone (R. 60). Uses permitted in this zone 
include "One family dwellings - farm labor dwellings." 
Article VIII, 8-5-3 (R. 70), Area Requirements, 
of the zoning ordinance provides that: 
In order to discourage urbanization in 
this zone, an area of not less than three 
acres shall be provided and maintained 
for each one family and/or two family 
dwelling, except that the area of a building 
site in a summer homes subdivision may 
be reduced to one-half (1/2) acre, when 
such subdivision has been approved by the 
Planning Commission. For all other 
buildings there shall be no minimum area 
requirements. 
In meetings between the Sevier County Zoning Com-
mission and plaintiff, certain suggestions and requests 
were made, such as; that creek lots be set back at least 
100 feet from Clear Creek; that no mobile homes be permitted; 
and that restrictions be prepared so providing. It was 
also discussed that the means of establishing a home owners 
association would be provided for in the restrictive covenants 
and that said association would aid or manage the garbage 
and trash collection and disposal (plaintiff's deposition, 
R. 92). 
-3-
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A proposed plat map of the deveJopment was pr 
- epared 
and submitted to the Planning and Zoning Commission by the 
project engineer, Ray Blackham. The plan submitted was 
a proposal to develop the area into lots. Each lot was to 
be in excess of one-half (1/2) acre (R. 52) pursuant to 
Zoning Ordinance Article VIII, B-5-3 (R. 70), permitting 
such when approved by the Planning Commission. 
The proposal was reviewed by defendants in a Sevier 
County Zoning Board meeting held March 31, 1976 (R. 61). 
At the meeting, which plaintiff attended, no specific objec-
tions or findings were made or found by the Board (R. 61). 
There were general objections indicating that the County 
Attorney did not want the property subdivided. Standards 
for roads were discussed, but no specific requirements 
were made or requested. Problems of school transportation 
were also discussed. 
Plaintiff's representative, Ray Blackham,appeared 
at the Sevier County Commission meeting on April 5, 1976, 
where he presented plaintiffs proposal. After reviewing 
the proposal and the planning commission's recommendation 
(R. 61), the defendants denied plaintiff's application 
(R. 65). Plaintiff was notified of defendants' decision 
b t M 6 1976 by rece ipt of a letter dated April on or a ou ay , , ~ 
29, 1976, from Devon Polson (R. 66). The letter was purportia: 
signed by Scott Hawley. 
Plaintiff responded to this denial in letter dated 
Pl icant June 18, 1976, advising the Commissioners that the ap 
-4-
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was desirous of meeting any and all requirements and that 
applicant would redesign the subdivision to eliminate any 
objections and to conform to any requirements of the zoning 
ordinance (plaintiff's deposition, p. 17). Plaintiff made 
frequent personal and verbal inquiries as to what he needed 
to do to obtain approval of the plat, but was given no advice 
or information as to requirements that had not been met. 
Plaintiff recognized that pursuant§ 8-5-3 (R.70) 
of the zoning ordinance, building sites could be reduced 
to one-half (1/2) acre lots only if approved by the planning 
commission. In such a case, some discretion was given to 
the Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of Commissioners. 
Plaintiff, therefore, revised the proposed plat of Clear 
Creek Heights and provided for each lot to contain in excess 
of three acres, thus complying fully and completely with 
the zoning ordinance ("An area of not less than three acres 
shall be provided and maintained for each one family, and/or 
two family dwelling.") Plaintiff thereby removed any necessity for 
the exercise of discretion on the part of the Board of Commissioners. 
After revision of the subdivision plat, it was 
again submitted to the Sevier County Board of Commissioners 
and plaintiff was advised that the consideration of the 
same would be had at a duly scheduled meeting on April 
19, 1977, following a public hearing on the adoption of 
a proposed new zoning and subdivision ordinance for Sevier 
County. 
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Plaintiff attended the meeting and, after the dis-
cussion on the proposed new ordinance was con 1 d l c u ec , Plainfr: 
asked to be heard regarding approval of his subdivision 
plat application. Plaintiff was advised by Mr. Hawley 
and by Ken Melaird, who was proposing the new subdivis~n 
and zoning ordinance, that plaintiff's proposed subdivision 
was not permitted in the GRF-1 zone and there was nothing 
further to consider. No formal meeting or discussion on 
the question was conducted at that time nor did plaintiff 
have an opportunity to be heard. Plaintiff was not advised 
of any formal action taken,either then or at a later ti~ 
(Hawley deposition p. 29, lines 8-12; plaintiff's deposition, 
p. 35, lines 5-25). 
'rhe Sevier County Planning and Zoning Commission 
and Sevier County Commissioners have consistentl',' and repeatec. 
refused to give further consideration to the approval of 
plaintiff's subdivision (plaintiff's deposition p. 15, lines 
5-25). The Sevier County Planning and Zoning Commission 
and its director, as well as the County Commissioners, 
have consistently refused to give further details or ru~~ 




DEFENDANTS' REFUSAL TO APPROVE PLAINTIFF'S 
SUBDIVISON PLAT, WHICH C0!1PLIES FULLY \HTH 
APPLICABLE ZONING ORDINANCES, IS ARBITRARY I'lr; 
AND CAPRICIOUS. THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAIN ' ' 
DEFENDANT'S !10'l'ION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
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In Na.Yl-or v. Salt Lake City Coro., 17 Utah 2d 300, 
410 P.2d 764 (1966), the Utah Supreme Court held that: 
In conformity with well established rules 
relating to the powers of administrative 
bodies, it is to be assumed that they have 
some specialized knowledge of the conditions 
and the needs upon which the discharge 
of their duties depends. Because the law 
imooses this dutv orimarilv uoon the Commission, 
and because of its oresumed expertise in 
fulfilling that responsibility, the court 
will not invade the province of the 
Commission and substitute its judgment 
therefore; nor will it interfere with 
the prerogatives of the Commission unless 
it is shown to be so clearly in error 
that there is no reasonable basis what-
soever to justify it and its action must 
therefore be regarded as capricious and 
arbitrary. (emphasis added) 
The defendant's refusal to approve plaintiff's 
subdivision plat is "so clearly in error that there is 
no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify it." Therefore, 
its actions must be "regarded as capricious and arbitrary." 
The Se~ier County Zoning Ordinance authorizes 
nine different zones, one of which is the GRF-1 zone. 
A careful analysis of the entire ordinance and the require-
ments of the GRF-1 zone makes clear the necessity of 
defendants' approval of plaintiff's subdivision nlat. 
A. Plaintiffs proposed subdivision plat satisfies 
the requirements of the GRF-1 zone. 
Zoning ordinances are a limitation on a property 
owners rights. Hence the requirement in Utah--that such 
ordinances and regulations should be designed only "for 
the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, convenience, 
-7-
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order, prosperity or welfare of the inhabitants of Utah. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-13 (1953). Therefore, a zoninq 
ordinance, being in derogation of common law prooerty 
rights, should be strictly contrued. Any ambiguity or 
uncertainty should be decided in favor of the property 
owner. Cubby v. Hammond, 68 Ariz, 17, 198 P.2d 114 (194R). 
It is clear that under the Sevier Countv 7.oning 
Ordinance the regulations incluc.ed as §§ 8-5-2 to 8-5-8, 
have been adopted with the express purpose of accomplishinq 
the stated objectives and purposes of the GRF-1 zone. 
Article VIII, § 8-5-1 provides: 
The objectives of establishing the GRI'-1 Grazinq, 
Recreation and Forestry Zone are: 
1. To promote the use of land for forestry, 
fish, wildlife and recreational and livestock grazir.: 
purposes. 
2. To secure economy in the cost of supplying 
police and fire protection, roads and other public 
services, and to redue waste from an excessive millli' 
of roads. 
3. To preserve insofar as possible, natural SW 
attractions natural vegetations, and other natural 
features within the zone. 
4. . of commercial and I To prevent the scattering "~ 
urban uses into the zone. 
5. To promote sanitation and protect and conser 
the water surply and other natural resources· 
6. To protect irban development. 
-8-
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Section 8-5-1 then continues: 
In order to accomplish th~se objectives and purposes 
and to protect the essential characteristics of the 
zone, the following regulations shall apply in the 
GRF-1 Grazing, Recreation and Forestry Zone: (Emphasis 
added) 
Sections 8-5-2 to 8-5-8 follow as those regulations 
designed to accomplish the objectives of the GRF-1 zone. 
Therefore, if the plaintiff can meet the requirements under 
§§ 8-5-2 to 8-5-8, he should be considered as having satisfied 
the stated objectives and purposes of the r,RF-1 zone. 
The plaintiff satisfies the § 8-5-2 Use Requirements 
Regulation. His proposed subdivision plat includes one single 
family dwelling per lot. The GRF-1 zone allows "One family 
dwellings." Article II of the Sevier County Zoning Resolution 
defines "family" as 
An individual or two (2) or more persons related by 
blood, marriage or adoption living together in a dwelling 
unit. Guests in excess of two (2) who pay for meals 
or room shall be considered as boarders. 
The same article defines a "dwelling" as: 
A building or portion thereof designed exclusively 
for residential occupancy, but not including hotels, 
tourist cabins, and boarding houses. 
Article II defines a "one family dwelling" as: "A detached 
building containing only one dwelling unit." 
Thus, § 8-5-2, in conjunction with Article II, expressly 
authorizes single family, residential dwellings in a GRF-1 
zone. The plaintiff satisfies this requirements. 
The addition of "farm labor dwellings" following "one-
family dwellings" in § 8-5-2 is confusing and ambiguous. 
There is no definition in Article II clarifying "farm-labor 
-9-
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dwellings." Therefore, the court should interpret "farm-lab~:' 
dwellings" in favor of the plaintiff land owner as an additu 
to and not a qualification of "One-Family Dwelling." 
In addition, the court should note the express 
au the:, 
tion in § 8-5-2 of the use of "Private summer cottages and 
accessory buildings." Contrary to the defendants' argu~M, 
the regulation writers distinguished between summer cottaqes 
and single-family residential dwellings, and allowed the use 
of both types of dwellings. 
Plaintiff satisfies the § 8-5-3 area requiremen~ 
regulation. Section 8-5-3 requires that "an area of not less 
than three (3) acres shall be provided and maintained fur 
each one-family and/or two-family dwelling In addi:: 
§ 3-5-3 provides that "a subdivision may be reduced to one· 
half (1/2) acre when such subdivision has been approved by 
the planning commission." Thus the planning commission has ! 
discretion to allow a subdivision with lots smaller than thr', 
(3) acres as long as they are larger than one-half (1/2) acr' 
But the regulations divest the planninq commission of any 
discretion in approving subdivisions with lots larger than 
three (3) acres. A subdivision with lots larger than t~~ 
(3) aces, that otherwise meets the GRF-1 requirements, must 
be approved by the county planning and zoning commission. 
The Plaintiff's first submitted plan was a proposal 
f one-hal' to develop the property into lots, each in excess o 
(1/2) acre. . . d. tion and The defendants exercised their iscre 
rejected the proposal. · 'ff' s·cond However, the plainti s e 
-10-
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proposal provided for each lot to contain in excess of three 
()) acres. Thus, the plaintiff has strictly complied with 
§ 8-5-3 and defendants have no authority to reject the 
plaintiff's proposal on this ground. 
All of the remaining requirements under the GRF-1 
zoning regulations have been met and are not in issue. 
Therefore, by satisfying all of the regulations under 
§§ 8-5-2 to 8-5-8, the "objectives and purposes" of protecting 
"the essential characteristics of the GRF-1 zone" are satisfied. 
B. The Sevier County Board of Commissioners has 
a Ministerial duty to Approve plaintiff's plat that has 
satisfied all of the GRF-1 zone requirements. 
Under Utah law, the Sevier County Board of Commissioners 
has the authority to zone and regulate the unincorporated 
territory within the county. Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-1, 
17-27-9 to 17-27-11 (1953). The Commissioners also have 
the authority to enforce the zoning regulations by with-
holding building permits. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-12 (1953). 
However, these legislative and administrative powers cannot 
be confused. The county Board of Commissioners has the 
power to legislate by adopting zoning ordinances and regulations. 
But once having legislated it is then the commissioners' 
responsibility to enforce the zoning ordinance and its 
regulations. 
In Contracts Funding and Mortgage Exchange v. Maynes, 
527 P.2d 1073 (Utah 1974), a county Board of Commissioners 
ignored this important distintion between their legislation 
-11-
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and enforcement functions. In Maynes, a property owner 
attempted to secure a building permit in a section of 
the county that was not zoned, having done everything 
necessary under the then existing laws. Instead of grantini 
the permit, the County Board of Commissioners passed a 
zoning ordinance excluding the property owner's proposal, 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the property owner, 
having done everything necessary under existing laws, m~t 
have his application approved. The court explained: 
The simple fact is, that a property 
owner, having done everything necessary 
under existing laws, cannot be expected 
to be circumscribed by ex post facto modus 
operandi leges, such as zoning ordianances 
presuming to upside-down the hour glass. 
(id. at 1074). 
' 
I 
Rather than passing ex post facto zoning regulation;,! 
the defendants are attempting to block the plaintiff's 
application for a building permit using <l similar form of 
after the fact legislation. The defendant commissioners 
do not cite specific zoning regulation which bar the 
plaintiff's application, but simply claim that the plaintiff' 
proposed development "is inimical to most, if not all, 
of the objectives of this zone." (see, Defendant' s !lotion 
for Summary Judgment) 
By discussing, writing, debating and adopting the 
Sevier County h 
defenc'i Zoning Ordinance and its regulation t e ! 
commissioners satisfied their legislative function. 
At thot: 
d and oub)ic time, and in the form of use, area, width, yar s 
consistent health requirements, defendants decided what was 
with, and what was inimical to, Of 
the <;Rf-1 the objectives Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah S ate Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
zone. By now attempting to define the plaintiff's proposed 
development as "inimical to the objectives" of the GRF-1 
zone, when the GRF-1 requirements have been satisfied, 
the defendant Commissioners are legislating after the fact. 
This principle is clearly recognized in other 
jurisdictions. In State ex rel. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 
45 Wash 2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954), the court ruled that 
a use permit must issue as a matter of right where the property 
owner has complied with the zoning ordinance. The court 
explained: 
The discretions premissible in zoning matters 
is that which is exercised in adopting the zone 
classifications with in the terms, standards, 
and requirements pertinent thereto, all of which 
must be by general ordinance applicable to all 
persons alike. The acts of administering a zoning 
ordinance do not go back to the questions of policy 
and discretion which were settled at the time of 
the adoption of the ordinance. Administrative 
authorities are properly concerned with questions 
of compliance with the ordinance, not with its 
wisdom. (id. at 902). See also City of Colorado 
Springs v. Street, 81 Colo. 181, 254 P. 440 (1927). 
The use, area, width, yards and public health re-
quirements found in Article VIII, §§ 8-5-2 to 8-5-6, were 
instituted to accomplish the objectives and purposes of 
the GRF-1 zone; and the plaintiff's proposed development 
satisfies all of these requirements. Under these circum-
stances, the defendant commissioners do not have the right, 
authority, or power to refuse to approve plaintiff's plat. 
By so doing, defendant's actions were capricious and arbitrary. 
-13-
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POI!n II 
THE SEVIER COUN'I'Y BOARD OF COMMISSIONE 
1 ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY ~ 
BY DEPRIVING PLAINTIFF OF' HIS ADllINIS , 
TIVE REMEDIES. T!I) .• 
Under Utah law, a developer desiring approval of 
a plat must first submit his proposed plat to the Board 
of County Commissioners who will then either grant or withhol' 
a building permit. Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-21-8, 17-27-12 
(1953). If a plat is not approved he then can appeal ilie 
decision to the Board of Adjustment, provided the Board 
of Adjustment has the jurisdiction and power to consider 
the case. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-15, 17-27-16 (1953). 
The plaintiff first sought defendant's approval I 
of the plat containing one-half (1/2) acre lots. The defenda: 
Board rejected the proposal. The plaintiff revised the 
plat and provided that each lot contain in excess of thr~ 
(3) acres, thus fully complying with the zoning ordinance. 
The revision of the subdivision plat was again 
submitted to defendants, as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 17-21-8 and 17-21-12. Without the benefit of a formal 
meeting, discussion or any formal action, the plaintiff 
was informed that his proposed subdivision was not permitted 
in a GRF-1 zone. Plaintiff was not advised of any formal 
action taken either then or at a later time. Rather than 
holding a hearing and formally granting or rejectinq the 
proposal, the defendant Board has done nothinq. 
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Section 17-27-16 of the Utah Code provides: 
Upon appeals the board of adjustment shall 
have the following powers: 
(l) To hear and decide appeals where it 
is alledged by the appellant that there 
is error in any order, requirement decision 
or refusal made by any administrative official 
or agency based on or made in the enforcement 
or the zoning resolution. (emphasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court explained that § 17-27-16 
of the Utah Code is designed "to assure speedy appeal to 
the proper tribunal any grievance that a party may have 
who is adversed by a decision of an administrative agency." 
(emphasis added) Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 15 Utah 
2d 305, 3flB, 392 P. 2d 4fl, 42 (1964). 
The Board of Adjustments only has power to hear 
appeals based on some affirmative and official action taken 
by the Board of County Commissioners. By refusing to consider 
plaintiff's second proposal, the defendant Board did not 
and has not made "any order, requirement decision or refusal" 
from which plantiff can appeal before the board of adjustment. 
Thus, defendants have effectively cut plaintiff off from 
his administrative remedy. 
The defendant Sevier County Board of Commissioners 
as a duty under the law to review plaintiff's proposed 
development and either approve or reject it, thereby preserving 
his administrative remedies. By their refusal to even 
consider plaintiff's second proposal they have acted in 
direct violation of Utah law. Such action is arbitrary 
and ca pr ic ious. 
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POINT III 
WHETHER DEFENDANTS ACTED ARBITRARILY 
AND CAPRICIOUSLY IS A MATERIAL FACT, 
SHARPLY DISPUTED, THEREBY MAKING IT 
ERROR FOR THE COUR'r TO GRANT SUMMAHY 
JUDGMEN'l'. 
The question of whether or not the defendants acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously is fraught with numerous 
questions of fact, all of which are sharply disputed by 
the parties. The granting of the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment is, therefore, error. 
In order to avoid the taint of having their actions 
declared arbitrary and capricious, the defendants must 
show facts evidencing that; a fair hearing, or that any 
hearing at all, was accorded to the plaintiff; that all 
interested parties were given a reasonable opportunity 
to be heard; that a quorum of the commission was present, 
and that a majority agreed upon the determination that 
was made {see 2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law; pp. 650-
652). Plaintiff's deposition, at pages 11 through 38, 
painfully details the failure of the defendants to comply 
with any of the foregoing requirements. 
At page 31 of his deposition the plaintiff testified' 
that "everybody started to walk out of the buildinq after 
the zoning meeting." Speaking to one of the defendants , 
'f'i 
he asked, "well aren't we going to have a hearing" (Plaint!', 
I 
deposition, p. 32). These pages of the deposition show 
the frustration of the plaintiff 
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a conference table one or two of the commission members 
to gain a listening ear. Facts indicating the presence 
of a quorum or a majority decision are nonexistent. 
The significance of these factual matters is set 
forth in the case of Bennett v. Price, 446 P.2d 419, 421 
(Colo. 1968). In the ~en~~~.!. case the Colorado Supreme 
Court stated that: 
[i)n determining whether any administrative 
action is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, 
or an abuse of discretion, it is necessary 
to look at the functions of the agency involved 
and the totality of the factual background 
in which the agency was functioning at the 
time of the challenged act: (emphasis added). 
The necessity for the review of the factual background 
of alleged arbitrary and capricious actions is further 
set forth in K & L Distributors, Inc. v. Murkowski, 486 
P.2d 351,357-8 (Alaska 1971). In this case, the court 
stated that they would review the matter to determine 
that: 
[n]o findings were made except on due notice 
and opportunity to be heard, that the procedure 
at the hearing was consistent with a fair 
trial, and that the hearing was conducted 
in such a way that there is an opportunity 
for a court to ascertain whether the applicable 
rules of law and procedure were observed. 
The review of factual determinations becomes 
a review to find whether the administrative 
decision has passed beyond the lowest limit 
of the permitted zone of reasonableness to 
become capricious, arbitrary or confiscatory. 
The facts, as viewed in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff, clearly show that the defendants acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously. At the very least, such 
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facts are sharply disputed. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly rulec1. that 
summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should be granted 
only with reluctance and with great caution. Housely 
v. Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967). 
This principle is stated plainly in Frederick May & co. 
v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962): 
To sustain a summary judgment, the pleadings 
evidence, admissions, and inferences must 
show that there is not a genuine issue of 
mater~al fact and that the winner is entitl~ I 
to a Judgment as a matter of law. Such showing· 
must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasona~i: 
possibility that the loser could win if given 
a trial. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the granting of a 
surrunary judgment, in the matter now before the Court, 
is error. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's subdivision plat containing three (3) 
acre lots with one single family dwelling per lot compl~S 
fully with the regulations and requirements under the GRF-1 
zone. 
Despite the qualification of plaintiff's subdivision 
plat under the GRF-1 zoning regulations, the lower court 
sustained defendant's motion for summary judgment without 
· · · Such was in error. 
explaining the grounds for its decision. , 
. 1 to I Futhermore, significant disputes about facts, materia 
defendant's· 
plaintiff's claims, preclude the grdnting of the 
motion for summary judgment. 
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The court should have sustained plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment because: 
(1) Defendant's refusal to approve plaintiff's 
subdivision plat, which complies fully with the GRF-1 
zoning ordinance, is arbitrdry and capricious, and 
(2) Defendants' refusal to allow plaintiff 
access to his administrative remedies is arbitrary and 
capricious. 
Respectfully submited this :zlR day of December, 
19 79. 
EARL S. SPAFFORD 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I .hereby certify that I mailed two copies of 
the foregoing to K. L. Mciff attorney for the defendants 
and respondents, at 151 North Main Street, Richfield, 
Utah 84701, this ~/i~ day of December, 1979. 
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